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'The day of the small unit is over, partly for
technical reasons, even more for marketing rea-
Sons ... we need the maximum degree of decen-
tralisation which is compatible with large units
and regulated competition'
J. M. Keynes, The Nation, 1927
'The coal industry has ruined itself by uncon-
trolled overproduction ... the cotton industry, on
the other hand, has ruined itelf by organised
short-time'
J. M. Keynes, The Nation, 1927
'Keynes' insight was to point out that there was
good reason to believe that, as industrial society
grew older, revenues would be less certain, fu-
ture innovation more certain and interest rates
relatively slow to move down ... for Keynes, like
Ricardo, the person who ultimately decided over
production ... feels besieged by circumstance
and yet still makes crucial decisions for society.'
Cole, Cameron and Edwards,
Why Economists Disagree, 1992
1 THE MYTHS OF FREE-STANDING NEO-
CLASSICAL ECONOMICS
All economics is based on fundamental assumptions
that are not examinable from within the discipline of
economics itself. The sphere of the economic in life
has never been exhaustively, internally explained by
economics. Notably, assumptions about power
underpin the subject of economics in all its variants.
Neo-classical economics, virtually hegemonic in
social (and increasingly, political) theorizing in the
I 980s, freely admits assumptions of atomistic indi-
vidualism and asserts axiomatic principals of ra-
tional choice. It may appear to be unconcerned with
power. The non-testability of the explicit assump-
tions, though much criticized by sceptics, is de-
fended by neo-classical proponents on the basis of
appeal to Karl Popper's falsification version of logi-
cal positivism. The use of individualism as a basic
assumption is linked with an implicit concept of
social power, albeit restricted to the state and re-
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duced to a matter of crude choice between a state's
allowing liberty or a state's enforcing tyranny.
To gain from trade, market forces require a strong
state determined and resourced enough to restrain
claims not based on individual voluntary contract.
Laisser faire was a sound-bite phrase of anti-feudal-
ism. In actuality, running a market system effec-
tively requires a narrow but deep state willing to act
with total determination to enforce voluntary con-
tract in current transactions, independent of the
origins of the distribution of social wealth.
The implications for development strategies of this
view of the power agenda of neo-classical econom-
ics are profound. To achieve whatever degree of
advancement may be offered by market forces in the
late twentieth century, requires not a diminution of
the state but its enhancement though with an ele-
ment of re-direction. Coercion is implicit in the neo-
classical power agenda as in all variants of econom-
ics, but arguably the need for direct coercion may be
reduced not the more individualist the general con-
sciousness of socio-economic actors, but rather the
more collectivist.
'Modernization' development theory offered a crude
cultural anthropology and political project to neo-
classical economics based upon the construction of a
national entrepreneurial spirit. But with its broad
sociological perspective, 'modernization' theory
questioned the 'apolitical naturalness' of market
systems and the hegemony of neo-classical econom-
ics over all other forms of social thinking.
Current efforts in the development field to associate
neo-classical economics, electorally pluralist poli-
tics, and the so-called 'social' dimensions of struc-
tural adjustment represent an important concession
to multi-disciplinarity in practice. Unfortunately,
they do not appear to have involved any advance in
thinking about development. An alternative per-
spective is needed which is capable of seeking mar-
ket forces operating as an aspect of power, rather
than seeing power merely as a matter of allowing
autonomous market forces to operate so as to reveal
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the efficient, equitable and stable outcomes inherent
in the sum of individual choices and actions.
2 THE NON-MARXIAN ECONOMICS
ALTERNATIVE
There is a well-established, alternative line of think-
ing in main-stream 'Western' economics - putting
the Marxian tradition with its explicit emphasis on
power to one side. David Ricardo was happy to
assume that technology and the fundamental pat-
tern of distribution between the great classes of
landlords, capitalists and labourers were both deter-
mined prior to the operation of market forces. Fol-
lowing in the line of Ricardo's thinking, John Stuart
Mill asserted that the basic pattern of distribution
was determined in the political sphere and technol-
ogy in the engineering sphere as self-evident facts,
preceding the operation of market forces.
The notion of surplus, to which there is no individual
right on efficiency or equity grounds, was seen by
Ricardo as a 'natural bounty' which only arbitrary
rules of distribution allocated to landowners. Since
Ricardo, the concept of 'rent' has received a virtually
universal bad press across ecOnomics, passing
through colonial 'founders' benefit' and culminat-
ing in 'bureaucratic rent-seeking' in the 1980s. The
history of economic thought on rent has separated
the concept from land and associated it with power
- at the cost of insulating the rest of economics from
explicit reference to power.
Keynes was typically awkward in finding some
virtue in rent, drawing on Maithus' praise of the high
spending propensity of landowners, as a source of
effective demand. But he also widened the idea of
undue rewards to include elements of interest pay-
ments. Keynes barely considered the claim that
interest payments were a natural reward for absten-
tion from consumption in mid-twentieth century
Britain - probably due to the relatively high level of
average wealth and little sign of abstention among
the 'savers'. He also treated technological change as
an autonomous process arising from the search for
greater knowledge, which could thus be seen as
generating a potential surplus on which those with
titles to interest payments have a primary claim
(which is naturally neither equitable nor efficient).
Keynes saw the processes surrounding interest pay-
ments as socially irrational and appealed for the
exercise of state power over them. It is only an
extension of his argument to suggest that the signifi-
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cance of interest payments in any economy is di-
rectly related to the power exercised by interest
receivers, a point we shall return to in the conclusion
to this paper.
Explicit rigorous development of Ricardo's analyti-
cal principles received a great boost in the late 1960s
when Fiero Sraffa finally published the catchily
titled 'Production of Commodities by Means of Com-
modities' - a book begun in the 1920s. In construct-
ing a model of an economy capable of producing a
surplus above subsistence, Sraffa explicitly assumed
fixed methods of production and social rules of
distribution. Sraffa assumed that distribution only
involved a single wage rate and a uniform rate of
profit. He was then able mathematically to demon-
strate that a set of market prices existed that would
merely reflect the distribution between wage receiv-
ers and profit receivers in existence before the opera-
tion of market forces, given the state of technology.
Institutional arrangements embodying power rela-
tionships were primary.
Sraffa's work resonated with the perspective on
underdevelopment centred on the concept of de-
pendency. Sraffa's neo-Ricardian assumptions were
totally compatible with assertions that the exercise
of power in colonial and neo-colonial structures had
produced basic rules governing the distribution of
technology and sources of income - for instance
depressed wage rates and primary commodity prices.
Starting from assumptions of crucial inflexibilities,
conclusions can be logically derived showing that
market forces may act merely to reproduce the
fundamental power inequalities.
This basic framework for understanding the eco-
nomic aspect of life with power as a central concept
exists and has been applied to the explanation of
international inequalities. Neo-Ricardian econom-
ics has a capacity for contributing to a broadly
defined 'world system' research programme inte-
grating its own insights with those derived from the
politics of inter-state relations, neo-Marxian cultural
anthropology, and the ecological analysis of envi-
ronmental change.
Unequal power mean that the outcomes of volun-
tary contracts between agents seeking market sur-
vival can be characterized as unequal exchange. The
outcome of unequal exchange distributes the accu-
mulation opportunities arising from surplus in the
global system in a manner tending to confirm a
historical pattern of power relationships Claims
against that pattern can be made legitimately on the
basis that the historical exercise of power does not
confer rights. Unfortunately enforcing claims to a
New International Economic Order requires more
than legitimacy; it also requires the anti-systemic
forces to construct a power base themselves and that
power base has proved very difficult to construct, as
the experience of OPEC and UNCTAD suggests.
An important challenge for the contribution which
economics could provide to this research programme
is to take the lead in providing insights into the
behaviour of meso-economic agencies, which might
be broadly categorized by the more familiar term
'industries' - though that term has no precise empiri-
cal meaning. The challenge is to find a theoretical
approach that neither collapses into the
agglomerations of perfectly competitive, powerless
entrepreneurs characteristic of neo-classical econom-
ics, nor usurps the whole theoretical terrain with
each industry being a single monopolistic bloc of
invulnerable trans-national corporations. The re-
mainder of this paper will attempt to indicate how
this gap in a 'world system' research programme
may be filled; demonstrating how power operates at
the level of an industry drawing on the work of J.M.
Keynes.
3 KEYNES AND INDUSTRIAL STAGNATION
Contrary to the impression that Keynes only dealt in
theories of whole economies, he actually devoted
considerable effort to understanding economic
change at the level of the industry. In the General
Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, he
introduces the concept of 'user cost' to describe how
a manager decides whether to utilize a piece of
existing machinery or purchase a piece of new ma-
chinery, that is to make the decision to invest.
For Keynes, the manager is forced to be continually
aware of the economic life of machinery - the ap-
pearance of a durable piece of equipment is an
illusion. Machinery is both more durable and more
fluid than its physical appearance suggests. It is
more durable since its physical life may be extended
through active maintenance, which also makes the
machinery a potential carrier of value. It is more
fluid as changes in technology lower potential unit
costs, which can leave the manager the embarrassed
possessor of a fossil. The manager has to assess user
cost, balancing the impetus to use equipment imme-
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diately at maximum capacity due to the risk of its
economic redundancy against reasons to postpone
use if demand is expected to rise and machinery is a
more effective way of storing productive potential
compared to stocks of final output.
The parameters of this decision owe little to the
physical nature of the machinery or current prices of
inputs and outputs, but much to perceptions of the
possible behaviour of other agents. At the level of an
industry, these perceptions focus on the behaviour
of managers active in markets for the same machin-
ery and outputs. On the edge of the broadly defined
industry, moreover, can be found financial institu-
tions which move in and out of commitments in a
manner which may appear arbitrary to the indi-
vidual manager.
An appropriate metaphor for the manager's posi-
tion would be that of a minor lord in a besieged castle
rather than a confident entrepreneur at the centre of
a network of enforceable, voluntary and assured
contracts. The conventional neo-classical language
of marginal costs and revenues would only be usable
if subjective perceptions, notably on 'user cost', were
introduced to an extent that any claim to analytical
objectivity and the possibility of falsification would
be totally undermined. Thus the language of power
is as relevant to the analysis of the behaviour of
managers, including deception through bluff and
double-bluff, and virtual coercion through collu-
sion. For Keynes, an industry appears as much
defined by an uneasy clustering of power relation-
ships as by common outputs/inputs or shared mar-
kets and it was this perspective he brought to indus-
trial crises in the United Kingdom in the 1920s.
4 A CASE-STUDY OF AN INDUSTRY IN
DECLINE: THE UK COTTON INDUSTRY IN THE
1920S
Keynes wrote on the Lancashire cotton-spinning
industry around 1927 - about ten years before the
publication of his General Theory. His interven-
tions in the discussions about the crisis in the indus-
try initially took the form of a relatively detached,
overview article in The Nation before he was drawn
into the practicalities of reorganizing the industry.
Keynes first article started from the assumption that
the Lancashire cotton-spinning industry was work-
ing at well above potential minimum unit-cost due
to widespread short-time working in which high
'overhead' costs were financed by bank advances for
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recurrent expenditure. Banks were willing to make
such advances because the sheer size and long his-
tory of the industry with its substantial stocks of
machinery appeared to make loans sound proposi-
fions, compounded by their desire to secure loans
made earlier.
Keynes calculated that precisely equivalent spindles
in Japan were working four to five times the hours of
Lancashire's per week and this was a more signifi-
cant explanation of relative competitiveness than
relative wage rates. He concluded that the Lanca-
shire industry and its financiers were locked into a
very dubious common belief in a return to 'normal
times'. Any market upturn was given undue weight
as an indicator of rising long-term demand and a
reason to retain the existing technological and distri-
butional structures, not as a breathing space to un-
dertake fundamental restructuring.
Given this common perception on the part of banks
and industry, any reorganization of the industry
would be brought about crudely and haphazardly
through individual bankruptcies and consequent
revaluing of machinery in receivers' auctions if pur-
chasers could be found. However, bankruptcies
would not eliminate the most economically ineffec-
tive managements if those managements were heav-
ily indebted to major banks and thus least likely to be
literally bankrupted by the banks. A.ny reduction in
user cost of machinery per unit of output would put
economic pressure on other firms whose machinery
was still capitalized at previous values. There was a
possibility that this process could continue until
spinning firms, their machinery suppliers, and their
financiers had all been forced to adjust to the eco-
nomic reality demanded by international compara-
tive costs.
But Keynes argued that there was a world-wide
structural over-supply of cotton spinning capacity
and there was no ultimate pricing solution on a
world scale. Ultimate survival would depend upon
the ability to move the power relationship within the
industry from mutually enforced stasis to mutually
supportive change. He thus advocated formal
cartelization of the industry and wrote enthusiasti-
cally in 1929 supporting the idea of forming the
Lancashire Cotton Corporation backed by the Bank
of England. Cartelization for Keynes involved the
created of a negotiating forum (replacing the con-
spiratorial and speculative agora of the Manchester
Cotton Exchange) in which the whole industry would
decide upon reducing physical capacity, some re-
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capitalization of assets, improved flows of informa-
tion, elimination of least effective managements,
concentration on more promising, high quality mar-
ket areas, and negotiating lower input prices.
In Keynes view, without such imaginative
cartelization, the industry would continue to be
dominated by powerful vested interests (centred on
'those professional deaf-mutes', the banks (Keynes
1981: 605)) concerned to maintain the financial value
of large stocks of machinery. This alliance of vested
interests (given that the industry's workers were
excluded from the power structure) would confine
the agenda for action to putting pressure on wage
rates - a largely irrelevant issue for Keynes. No
innovative, wide-spread break-out was likely in such
a situation. On the contrary, a muddy, recrimina-
tory drift towards the disappearance of the industry,
as haphazard contraction removed external econo-
mies of scale, was more likely unless an initiative
were taken to persuade and/or coerce a change in
power relations which would underpin a commit-
ment to sustainability.
5 CONCLUSION
Keynes can be seen as an errant figure in a long line
of non-Marxian economists who have been happy to
accept that the understanding of power relation-
ships was a prior requirement for understanding the
outcome of market forces. For such economists, the
pattern of prices produced by apparently anony-
mous market forces merely reflect engineering pat-
terns of technology and political parameters of in-
come distribution.
At the level of the whole economy, Keynes placed
interest rates under the critical scrutiny previously
given to rents derived from land and found their
claim to social legitimacy and worth equally suspect.
His explicit argument was based on the social effi-
ciency impact of interest rates on processes of change,
rather than equity implications. But, if Keynes'
argument is extended to conclude that the level of
interest rates in any economy is significantly a prod-
uct of the power exercised by international financial
institutions, then both equity and efficiency argu-
ments may prove relevant to constructing an ideo-
logical programme to guide local anti-systemic chal-
lenge to that world power system - Islam's critique
of interest rates on ribat is clearly relevant here.
At the industry level, Keynes stressed the subjective,
judgemental aspect of decisions about choosing pro-
ductive capacity and how far to use it which were
crucial to economic development. For the manager,
the equally subjective calculations of other manag-
ers in the industry and of financiers are crucial. A
matrix of monetary flows containing subjective risks
and uncertainties maybe conceived in abstract terms
and examined from the perspective of institutional
economics by game-theory methods. But such meth-
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ods are unlikely to provide unambiguous predic-
fions except under very restrictive conditions. Keynes
approach was more direct, examining the observ-
able pattern of power relationships to good effect -
though the power was hardly being exercised to
good effect in developmental terms.
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